中国在发展风力发电方面取得了巨大的进步。截至2005年，已建成61个风电场，安装1864台并网型风力发电机。总装机容量已达1260兆瓦。中国政府去年调整了风电发展目标，将其从2万兆瓦提高到2020年的30兆瓦，使其成为全球第七大市场和亚洲第二大市场。
2006年1月1日生效的《可再生能源法》为中国可再生能源的发展提供了一个法律框架，其中包括建立其电力输出的支付系统，然而，国内外的风电开发商、投资商和制造商。hav&对现行的风电定价政策表示严重怀疑，认为这并没有为风电价格学的持续快速发展铺平道路。特别值得关注的是，新法继续实行通过公开招标确定风电项目并网电价的政策。这让潜在投资者望而却步。
特许权招标过程
我国某风电机组的动力传动系统具有较好的适应性。在第一阶段，风电开发由海外援助基金提供资金，支付的phee低于0 3元/kwh，与第二阶段的燃煤电厂类似，电价由地方政府决定，报中央政府，从相对较低的价格到1.2元/kwh不等。在第三阶段，从2002年开始，通过竞标特许权项目来决定关税。这些地点位于中央政府通过国家发改委选定的地区。
到目前为止，已经连续四轮招标的风电场特许经营项目数量已超过100兆瓦，每个项目的装机容量。为了鼓励国内涡轮制造业，中国制造了50%以上的aquipmenl musl。发电量的付款按中标率定为30000英镑
运行小时数，然后下降到塔尔之后的平均电价水平。合同有效期为25年。以最低的电网购买价格和最高的本地化生产比例承诺的潜在开发公司通常会中标
在最初的几轮谈判之后，特许权程序已经发生了变化。这些措施包括将制造业占比提高到70%，在决定中标时引入其他因素（除了pnee）。包括技术和商业问题，以及制造商通过制定明确的国内生产计划直接参与的机会。
特许权招标过程中的cxpcnccxj已公开，wcnkncaca的编号。其中最重要的一点是，以最低投标价中标的决定鼓励了企业，特别是国有企业，承诺以不合理的低价格中标。在这个过程中，他们要么进行了ov&r估算，要么低估了风力机和维护的成本。其结果是，即使在最近对该计划进行了调整之后，他们仍无法从中获得合理回报，价格仍然是最重要的决定因素。这些低廉的价格阻碍了其他企业的参与。
预计2006年《可再生能源法》将在这一过程中作出改变。然而，对风力发电行业失望的是，它并没有按照其他国家的规定引入关税壁垒，而是维持现有的招标制度。
海外经验
在世界其他地区，特别是欧洲，各国政府引入了一系列机制来支持风能和其他可再生技术。其中最成功的是德国和西班牙等国的上网电价制度。通过支付高于市场价格的固定溢价率，这些系统创造了一个稳定的经济环境，到2005年，第三个项目dovolopmcnt和国内制造业已经能够在这个环境中得到滋养。在12个欧洲国家（39.7千兆瓦）中，90%的风电装机容量是在那些实施馈入式tarrff政策的国家。
类似于在中国运作的招标系统的经验，例如英国的非化石燃料义务，并不乐观。在nffq风电项目的前十年里，成功地赢得了总计1150兆瓦的合同，而实际建造和生产的inai容量只有151兆瓦，成功率仅为13%。
china has rucunlly niddh grttal strides in developing wind power. by ihb hiid of 2005, 61 wind farms had been built and 1,864 grid-conncctcd wind turbine generators installed. the total installed capacity had reached 1,260 mw. making it the seventh largest market in the world and the second largest in asia last year, the chinese government modified its wind power development target, raising it from 20,000 mw to 30,odo mw by 2020.
the renewable energy law which came into effect on 1 january 2006, provides a legal framework tor the development of renewable energy in china, including the establishment of a payment system for their electricity output, however, wind developers, invesiors and manufacturers, both at home and abroad. hav& serious doubts about the current wind pricing policy and consider that it does not pave the way for tho continusd rapid development of the tedmology. of particular concern is that the new law continues the policy of cfeciding the grid-connected pov^er price for wind power projects through a public request for tenders. this is deterring potential investors.
the concession bidding process
tliere have bettn hues pliasbs in dtivtilapnidiu of a wind power turify syslam in china. in the first phase, wind power developments were funded by overseas aid funds and the phee paid was less than 0 3 yuan/kwh similar to that for coal-fired plants in the second phase, the tariff was decided by local government reported to central government and varied from a relatively low price up to 1.2 yuan/kwh. in the third phase, from 2002 onwards, tariffs have been decided by competitive bidding for concession projacls. these are located in regional sites selected by central government through the national development and reform commission.
to date there have boon four successive rounds of bidding fora number of concession wind farm projects each project has been over 100 mw installed capacity. in order to encourage a domestic turbine manufaclunng industry more than 50% of the aquipmenl musl be made in china. payment for the electricity output is set at the rate of the winning bid up to 30.000
hours of operation and then falls after thal to the level of the average electricity price. contracts run for 25 years. the prospective development company which commits to the lowest grid purchase price and the highest proportion of localised production usually wins the bid
changes have been made to the concession process after the initial rounds. these include an increase in the proportion of doitiestic manufacture to 70%, the introduction of other factors in deciding the successful bid (apart from pnee). including technical and commercial issues and an opportunity lor menufseturers to participete directly by preparing a clear plan for domestic production.
the cxpcncncxj of the concession bidding process haa exposed & numbor of wcnkncaaca. the most important of these is that the decision to make the lowest bid the winning bid has encouraged companies, especially state-owned enterprises, to commit to an unreasonably low price in order to win ih色 contract. in the process they have either ov&r-estimated the wind resource and cioctncity generation or underestimated tho cost of the wind turbines and maintenance. the result has been a project from which they will be unable to make a reasonable return even after the more recent adaptations to the scheme, price has continued to be the most important deciding factor. these low prices have discouraged other enterprises from participating.
it was anticipated that the 2006 renewable energy law would make changes co this process. much to the disappointment of the wind power industry, however, it did not introduce a fccd-in tariff along the lines of those operating other countries but maintained the existing bidding system
overseas experience
in other parts of the world, especially europe a range of mechanisms has been introduced by governments to support wind energy and other renewable technologies. the most successful of these have been the feed-in tariff systems operating in countries like germany and spain. through paying a fixed premium rate above the market price foreledricity, these systems hove created n stable economic onvironmcm in which tx>th project dovolopmcnt and domestic manufacture have been able to nourish by 2005. 90% of the total wind installed capacity in 12 european countries (39.7 gw) had been in those implementing feed-in-tarrff policies.
the experience of tendering systems similar to that operating in china, such as the non- fossil fuel obligation in the uk has not been positive. in the first ten years of the nffq wind pov^'ar contracts totaling 1,150 mw were successfully won howaver, only 151 mw of inai capacity was actually built and produced power, a success rate of just 13%.