自1990年代后期以来，一些州已经对其电力公用事业进行了重组，以引入零售竞争提供发电服务。这包括从弗吉尼亚州到缅因州的东北部几乎所有州，以及加利福尼亚州，德克萨斯州，俄亥俄州和伊利诺伊州。1其他州也正在审查零售竞争，但尚未实施或未完全批准。此外，由于联邦能源监管委员会（ferc）的输电开放访问和市场定价授权命令，批发电力市场在很大程度上被放松管制。 加州重组后的电力市场崩溃，导致许多消费者，电力生产商和政策制定者质疑将竞争引入零售电力市场的智慧。包括俄克拉荷马州，新墨西哥州和北卡罗来纳州在内的几个州已经停止实施或什至考虑采用零售竞争的早期计划。加利福尼亚州的情况也停止了联邦政府在零售层面进行全国性电力重组的努力。 然而，由于服务成本监管不足以激励人们提高效率，因此发电竞争仍然是监管的替代选择，因此有可能恢复大规模采用电力重组的进程。公民，环保主义者，能源生产者和政策制定者想了解电力市场的更大竞争可能如何影响电力部门的排放，并最终影响环境质量。 开放的输电通道是否会增加对中西部地区老式，高污染燃煤设施的使用，从而增加排放量？此类排放物的远距离运输是否会损害东部各州遵守《清洁空气法》的臭氧标准的能力？促进需求方管理和可再生能源利用的实用程序将变成什么样？如果重组能够实现承诺的较低电价，那么需求增加会导致排放量增加吗？ 重组可能导致用于发电的发电技术组合，电厂运营效率以及市场上交易的电力价格和数量发生重大变化，每一项都会影响排放。 这项研究着眼于重组对氮氧化物（nox）和二氧化碳（co2）的空气排放的影响。2它探讨了替代空气排放法规下重组的预期影响。它并未尝试衡量迄今为止发生的行业重组的影响。截至2001年初，美国约三分之一的地区引入了零售渠道，这种部分重组构成了我们研究的基准。我们力求通过全面零售进入全国范围的重组，估计对空气排放的影响。 对于nox排放，本研究的基准是夏季，即东北臭氧运输区（otr）的总量控制与交易计划。该研究将该基线与两种替代性和更广泛的nox监管制度进行了比较。第一种选择是将东北otr计划扩展到更广阔的地理区域-美国东部。第二种选择是将美国东部的总量管制和贸易计划从夏季延长到全年。对于二氧化碳的排放，研究基准是当今的现行无法规政策，另外两种替代政策是每公吨25美元和每公吨75美元的碳税。我们进行了一系列的大型模拟分析，其中包括三种nox监管情景，以及一个包含和不包含两个碳税水平的nox情景。 该研究模拟了2008年电力行业的运行情况。该模型提供了北美电力可靠性委员会（nerc）的13个子区域（请参见图a的注释）的地理详细信息，并估计了发电量（按燃料类型） ，容量组合，电价和空气排放。此外，建模还估算了遵守空气排放控制法规的成本。
since the late 1990s, several states have restructured their electric utilities to introduce retailcompetition for generation service. this includes almost all states in the northeastfrom virginia to maine, plus california, texas, ohio, and illinois.1 retail competitionhas been under review in other states, but not yet implemented or fully approved. in addition,wholesale electric markets are largely deregulated as a result of the transmission open-accessand market-pricing authority orders from the federal energy regulatory commission (ferc).
the collapse of california’s restructured electricity market has led many consumers, electricityproducers, and policymakers to question the wisdom of bringing competition to retailelectricity markets. several states, including oklahoma, new mexico, and north carolina, haveput the brakes on earlier plans to implement or even consider adopting retail competition. thesituation in california has also halted federal efforts to introduce nationwide electricity restructuringat the retail level.
nevertheless, because cost-of-service regulation provides insufficient incentives to improveefficiency, competition in electricity generation remains an attractive alternative to regulation.progress toward wide-scale adoption of electricity restructuring is, therefore, likely to resume.in the face of that eventuality, citizens, environmentalists, energy producers, and policymakerswant to understand how greater competition in electricity markets is likely to affect emissions from the electricity sector and, ultimately, environmental quality.
does open access to transmission increase use of older, higher-polluting coal-fired facilitiesin the midwest and consequently increase emissions? might the long-range transport of suchemissions compromise the ability of eastern states to comply with the clean air act’s ozonestandard? what would become of utility programs that promote demand-side management andthe use of renewable energy sources? and if restructuring delivered the promised lower pricesfor electricity, would increased demand lead to higher emissions?
restructuring could result in substantial changes in the mix of generation technologies employedto produce electricity, the efficiency of power plant operations, and the price and quantityof electricity traded in the marketplace—each of which can affect emissions.
this study looks at the effects of restructuring on air emissions of nitrogen oxides (nox)and carbon dioxide (co2).2 it addresses the expected impacts of restructuring under alternativeair emissions regulations. it does not attempt to measure the impacts of the industry restructuringthat have occurred to date. as of early 2001, about one-third of the united states had introducedretail access, and this partial restructuring forms the baseline for our study. we seekto estimate impacts on air emissions of moving to full retail access—nationwide restructuring.
for nox emissions, the baseline for this study is the summer season, cap-and-trade programfor the northeast ozone transport region (otr). the study compares this baseline withtwo alternative and more extensive nox regulatory regimes. the first alternative expands thenortheast otr program to a much wider geographic area—the eastern half of the unitedstates. the second alternative extends the cap-and-trade program for the eastern united statesfrom summer only to year-round. for co2 emissions, the study baseline is today’s current policyof no regulation, and the two alternative policies are a $25-per-metric-ton and a $75-permetric-toncarbon tax. we conducted a series of large-scale simulation analyses incorporating the three nox regulatory scenarios, plus one nox scenario with and without the two levels ofcarbon taxes.
the study simulates the operation of the electric power industry for the year 2008. the modelingprovides geographic detail at the level of 13 subregions (see note to figure a) of the northamerican electric reliability council (nerc) and estimates generation output (by fuel type),capacity mix, electricity prices, and air emissions. in addition, the modeling estimates the costsof complying with air emissions control regulations.